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I. INTRODUCTION
As the European Community (EC) moves toward its goal of
achieving a united Europe, it faces the challenge of evolving institu-
tions that will accommodate Europe's vast diversity, while at the same
time providing a firm foundation upon which European unity can be
fostered. The creation of "an ever closer union among the Peoples of
Europe"' will require a delicate balance between the interests of the
individual peoples of Europe and the interests of Europe as a whole
* Member of the Class of 1994. B.A. Santa Clara University, 1991. I Qh to ac-
knowledge my parents, Subramaniam and Lily Shastri. Their continuous counsel and sup-
port have been instrumental in making this Note a reality.
1. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [MAsrmcrr TrATY] pmbl. This treaty is in-
tended to transform the European Community into a European Union.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
entity-a type of balance that has not had to be struck in the West at
any time in history.
A little-known and little-understood federal model exists in Asia,
in a society that has a scale of diversity that in some respects even
exceeds Europe's diversity. India, with eighteen recognized lan-
guages, countless dialects, all of the world's major religions repre-
sented, and people in different stages of economic development has
arguably become the world's first society to transcend the parameters
of the modem nation-state. In over forty-five years since the achieve-
ment of independence, it has, in the context of a federal democracy,
formed a single defense and foreign policy, a single economic policy,
and a single national government. Above all, India has developed a
single constitution that, unlike many other constitutions of the
postcolonial world, has survived the test of time and continues to be
the highest law of the land.
While these two federal systems-one still being established, and
the other firmly established but still evolving-exist in the context of
great diversity, each of them is based upon a different premise. The
Indian model is based upon a strong central government with state
governments that are not sovereign, but which have constitutionally
enumerated powers.2 The European view of "cooperative federal-
ism," on the other hand, has emerged from collaboration among in-
dependent, sovereign nation-states.3 Each view of federalism poses
different sets of implications for the distribution of power in a federal
system.
This Note will examine these two approaches to federalism. The
Note will analyze and compare the features of these two systems, par-
ticularly features that relate to managing diversity within a unified
framework. Additionally, the analysis will include a critique of the
two models. Finally, the Note will seek to assess the lessons that In-
dia's already-established federal structure holds for the EC's emerging
federal system, as well as the prospects for the further development of
each of these systems.
2. G. N. Josm, Trm CONSTrUTION OF INDIA 24-27 (7th ed. 1983).
3. EMIL J. KIRCHNER, DECISION-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 12-14
(1992). Kirchner defines cooperative federalism as a system in which governments and
institutions (i.e., EC institutions) share joint tasks. In such a system, there is a "considera-
ble degree of sharing of competence" with the supernational institution. Id.
This Note will use the terms EC and Europe interchangeably.
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H. FEDERALISM DEFINED
In a general sense, federalism apportions power between differ-
ent levels of government within a state or country so that the central
governmental authority does not become too dominant. Such a sys-
tem preserves a degree of autonomy for the constituent units of a fed-
eration and, at the same time, allows a central authority to function.
One test for whether a system is federal is whether it "embod[ies]
predominantly a division of powers between general and regional au-
thorities," each of which in its own sphere is linked with others and
yet independent of them.4
The differences between various federal systems lie in the nature
of the distribution of power between the separate governmental au-
thorities.' In some systems, the central government devolves power to
the states, thereby making the constituent units more dependent on
the actions of the central government for their power. At the other
end of the spectrum, a model could be based on state sovereignty-a
model under which power would flow entirely from the constituent
units to the central authority. As a consequence, the central govern-
ment would be weak and very dependent on the constituent units.
While the Indian federal system is a hybrid of the devolution and
sovereign state models, the emerging EC model of federalism leans
strongly toward a weak central authority with very strong constituent
governments that are keen on protecting their sovereignty. The con-
trast between the two approaches in their distribution of power pro-
vides an insight into the dilemmas and challenges posed by each form
of federalism.
II. INDIAN FEDERALISM
India's federal system, as outlined in the Indian Constitution,
emerged from the movement for independence from Britain. The
constitution was drafted and enacted by a constituent assembly. The
constituent assembly, while not directly elected, was composed of
leaders from across the country who had been elected toward the end
of British rule. Because the members represented a wide cross-sec-
4. K. C. HV-EARE, FEDERAL GOERmiENT 33 (4th ed. 1963), quoted in M. C.
SETALVAD, UNION AND STATE RELATIoNs UNDER THE INDIAN CozsTrTmmo.- 36 (1974).
This test, while by no means the only one available, provides a starting point for under-
standing a concept that generally involves sharing of powers between governments.
5. For background regarding the reasons for establishment of federal systems and the
manner in which power is distributed, see JosHI, supra note 2, at 13-18.
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tion of society, the assembly could be considered representative of the
national will.6
The framers' main goal was to maintain the newly independent
country's unity, while accommodating India's vast diversity of lan-
guage, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.7 In this way, the different
constituent units would be able to share power with a central govern-
ment strong enough to maintain a common framework.
As a consequence, the constitution that resulted from the deliber-
ations provided for a federal system with a very strong central govern-
ment combined with specific enumerated powers that would lie solely
in the hands of the states.8 This system represented a compromise
between the two extreme ends of the spectrum of possible methods of
distributing power (i.e., a completely unitary system or an extremely
loose confederation of sovereign states).' While state governments
would have autonomy over key subjects, the central government
would ensure that India's diversity would not result in the disintegra-
tion of the unified state.
Over the past forty years, conflicting trends have emerged. On
one hand, during the 1970s and 1980s, there was a clear trend toward
centralization in order to consolidate economic planning, as well as for
political reasons.'" On the other hand, a stronger trend toward fur-
ther devolution and decentralization of power to the states, and to-
ward greater recognition of the need for self-expression of linguistic,
tribal, and religious groups, started in the 1950s and has persisted
6. JOSHI, supra note 2, at 10-12.
7. Id. at 24-25.
8. Id. at 24. The federal structure adopted by the framers is also partially derived
from Britain's 1935 Government of India Act, which devolved limited power to provincial
governments in response to demands for self-government by those campaigning for inde-
pendence. Id. at 4-5.
9. Id. at 23-24. The Indian Constitution both resembles and differs from other feder-
ations, since there are many unitary elements in its federal policy. Because it represents a
blend of both unitary and federal elements, some have gone so far as to label it "quasi-
federal." Id. at 23.
10. Alice Jacob, Center-State Government Relations in the Indian Federal System, in
THE UNION AND THE STATEs 21, 56-73 (S.N. Jain et al. eds., 1972). During the first 40
years of independence, Indian economic policy concentrated in building a self-reliant, in-
dustrialized economy with a common market. The central government played a key role in
allocating resources for industrial development through its five-year plans. Further, the
central government retained and exercised the power to decide which private sector com-
panies could operate; this was achieved through a licensing system that ensured the domi-
nance of the public sector in particular industries. The central government also
nationalized India's banks in the late 1960s. Id.
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since then." This trend toward decentralization has manifested itself
in the multiplication of national political parties since the 1967 na-
tional and state elections. The 1967 elections heralded the rise of the
multi-party reality and the decline of the one-party dominance of the
political scene by the Congress Party.12 The fact that a number of
parties now routinely hold power simultaneously at the state and fed-
eral levels necessarily means that power must be shared.13
Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s, in response to a series of agita-
tions by leaders of various linguistic groups, the center (the federal
government) reset state boundaries according to the language spoken
by the majority of the population living within specific areas. This act
gave greater recognition to the aspirations of individual minorities and
defused the potential for separatism.' 4 More recently, economic re-
forms by the central government have resulted in less power for bu-
reaucrats at the center and greater decentralization.'5
A. The Constitutional Structure
Under the Indian Constitution, the federal and state governments
have enumerated powers. The powers are divided between three
"Lists" that specifically enumerate which powers belong to each gov-
ernment and which powers are shared: the Union List, the State List,
and the Concurrent List.'6 This arrangement has been labeled by one
analyst as a "functional devolution," as opposed to a setup in which
11. V.R. Krishna Iyer, Needed, a Re-Orientation: Federalism, Nationalism and Sub-
National Autonomy, FRONTLINE, June 5, 1992, at 78.
12. PERCIVAL SPEAR, A HIsroRY OF INDIA 259-60 (1985). The Congress Party is In-
dia's oldest and largest party. It led India's movement for independence from England.
The Congress Party has also largely governed India at the national level for 42 of the last
47 years. Id. at 244-70. For further reading about Congress' role in post-independence
politics, see MIARK TuLLY & ZAREER MASANr, FROM RAI TO RAjIV:. 40 YEARS OF INDIAN
INDEPENDENCE 103-32 (1988).
13. T.C.A. Srinivasavaradan, Federal Management, 28 JOURNAL OF THE INDWAr L,.W
INST. 169, 186 (1986). For discussion of the transition from one-party dominance to multi-
party politics, see Center-State Relations-The Issues: A Basic Working Paper, in THE
UNION AND THE STATES, supra note 10, at 4. For discussion of demands for greater auton-
omy arising from multiplicity of parties, see K. Santhanam, Growing Demand for Greater
Autonomy, in The Union and the States, supra note 10, at 75.
14. MJ. AxmAp, INDIA: THE SIEo WrrtN 79-S1, 93-94 (1985).
15. S.L. Rao, Securities Scandal and Reforms, INDIA ABROAD, Aug. 14, 1992, at 2
Since July 1991, India has launched a -Aide-ranging policy of economic liberalization that
has dismantled the previous system of central regulation of economic activity, including
licensing and the overall central planning mechanism.
16. INDIA CONST. seventh sched. The residuary power of legislation (i.e., any
unenumerated powers) belongs to the Union Parliament. INDIA CONST. art. 248.
1994]
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the states are sovereign. 17 The Union List covers defense, foreign pol-
icy, currency, the judicial system, and the railways, among other re-
sponsibilities." The State List includes maintenance of law and order,
prisons, and public health.'9
Finally, the Concurrent List, which involves powers shared by
both the federal and state governments, includes criminal law, crimi-
nal procedure, and civil procedure, among other responsibilities.2" In
this area, each of the players has a role in formulating policy and pass-
ing legislation, although the center has supremacy in the event of con-
flicting legislation.2
Central legislation also has supremacy over state legislation con-
cerning areas in the State List that overlap with areas in the Union
List. According to the Indian Supreme Court, "when two enactments
both within the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when
the constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that
the enactment of one Legislature has superiority.., then to the extent
of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other."2 However, if a leg-
islature "with a superior efficacy" (that is, the Union Parliament) has
intended to cover the entire field of a subject, then the enactment of
the other legislature will be overridden, or will be encompassed within
the framework of the federal legislation.23 The courts have generally
avoided finding conflict by characterizing state legislation in a manner
that will allow it to stand.24
17. Jacob, supra note 10, at 72. Functional devolution refers to a system in which
powers are granted to the states by the central authority.
18. INDIA CONST. seventh sched.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. INDIA CONST. art. 254. In the absence of central legislation on the subject, the
Supreme Court has generally upheld state legislation regarding area- under the Concur-
rent List. Jacob, supra note 10, at 36.
22. INDIA CONST. arts. 246, 254; Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch, A.I.R. (S.C.) 1284, 1291
(1964). Tulloch involved a conflict between a federal law governing all mineral develop-
ment and an Orissa state lw governing mines in the state. Even though mines and mineral
development are on the state list in the constitution, the court held that the federal legisla-
ture, to the extent that it controlled the regulation and development of minerals, super-
seded the state legislature. Id. at 1291-92. This holding extends the logic of article 254
(which provides for federal supremacy in cases of conflict) to withdraw an enumerated
state power in the public interest.
23. Tulloch, A.I.R. at 1292.
24. Jacob, supra note 10, at 36-37. The courts have employed the doctrine of "pith and
substance," under which the courts examine the true nature and character of a piece of
legislation. Id. If the legislation falls within the powers conferred on the legislature that
has enacted it, then the legislation will be upheld, even if it incidentally intersects with
another legislature's sphere of responsibility. Id.
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Structurally, state governments as well as the federal government
follow a parliamentary system with two-house legislatures.25 How-
ever, while the national President, whose constitutional role is to act
as an impartial player who invites the prime minister-designate to
form a government, is indirectly elected by members of Parliament,
the counterpart in the states, the governor, is appointed by the central
government.26 This means that the distribution of power is, in this
respect, tilted toward the center and, therefore, has serious implica-
tions for relations between the center and the states within the Indian
federal system.27 On the other hand, the upper house (Rajya Sabha)
of the Parliament is elected by the state legislatures,2s thereby giving
state governmental institutions a voice in the decision-making process
in Delhi.
The judicial branch of government, unlike the elected branches, is
entirely unitary.29 The system is three-tiered: the Supreme Court is
the court of final appeal;30 the state high courts are the intermediate
appellate courts; and the district courts include trial and other lower
courts. The courts have jurisdiction over both federal and respective
state laws.?' Judges of the Supreme Court and of state high courts are
appointed by the central government in consultation with the chief
justice of India.32 Appointments to state high courts also require con-
sultation with the respective state government and, in the case of asso-
ciate high court judges, consultation with the high court chief justice. 3
Similarly, the constitution requires the state governor to consult the
state high court before appointing judges to district courts.34
25. See Josm, supra note 2, at 26-29. Some states have unicameral legislatures. INDIA
CONST. art. 168.
26. INDIA CONST. art. 155.
27. R B. Tewari, Role of Governor in the Centre-State Relations in India, in TE
UNiON AND 't= STATES, supra note 10, at 335-36. The governor plays essentially the same
role as the president. However, since the governor is appointed by the central govern-
ment, the governor's impartiality is more open to question. This is unlike the president
who is elected by Parliament. Id.
28. INDIA CONST. arts. 80, 81.
29. Josm, supra note 2, at 150-51.
30. In addition to its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over disputes between the center and the states and disputes between the states. LNoA
CONSr. art. 131. The Court also has jurisdiction, concurrent with state high courts, to isstue
orders regarding writs involving the enforcement of fundamental rights. This allo~s liti-
gants to take cases regarding fundamental rights directly to either the Supreme Court or
the state high courts. I& art. 32.
31. Josm, supra note 2, at 150-51.
32. INDIA CoNsT. arts. 124, 217.
33. Id.
34. 1& art. 233.
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India's civil services are responsible for the implementation of
laws at both the state and federal levels. These services, like the judi-
ciary, are unitary institutions that are not staffed by the state govern-
ments. The federal government periodically transfers civil servants
across the country in order to integrate policy nationwide and ensure
a degree of impartiality; further, this provides a national perspective
in the implementation of laws and regulations in the states.
3 5
B. The Dynamics of Center-State Relations
The complex relationship between the center and the states that
emerges out of India's constitutional framework reflects the difficul-
ties and challenges of maintaining a balance of power acceptable to
both sides. This relationship is a constantly changing process testing
the adaptability and ingenuity of the Indian federal system. As new
challenges arise, both sides must adjust.
Over the past forty-five years, the states have gradually carved
out well-defined areas of autonomy that provide a means for the di-
versity of India's population to be more fully represented. One area
in which the states have gained autonomy is in achieving linguistic
representation. Prior to the 1950s, the Indian government followed
the model of a strong center with four major administrative regions.
During the 1950s, a series of linguistic agitations led the government
to search for a new model. Thus, in the late 1950s, a commission was
constituted to reorganize the states on the basis of the dominant lan-
guage spoken within given boundaries.36 This process subsequently
helped to defuse the Tamilian secessionist agitation in what is now
Tamil Nadu and prevented other linguistic groups from developing
similar inclinations.3 7
Today, each of the twenty-five Indian states has its own official
language or languages, and the constitution recognizes eighteen differ-
ent languages.38 Each state uses its own language to conduct state
business and seeks to promote its own language and culture through
state institutions such as the educational system. Local television is
35. Working Papers, in Tim UNION AND THE STATES, supra note 10, at 7-8.
36. SPEAR, supra note 12, at 246-48.
37. Id. at 82-85, 97. These agitations occurred in parts of several states, including the
Telegu-speaking and Tamil-speaking areas of Madras, and the Marathi-speaking areas of
Bombay. In all of the cases, those leading the movements demanded the state boundaries
be redrawn to reflect the language spoken by the majority of those in each area at issue.
Id. at 74-81; see also id. at 246-48.
38. INDIA CONST. eighth sched.
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also broadcast in the state language. Regional parties, such as the
Dravida Progressive Front (DMK) and the All-India Dravida Progres-
sive Front (AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu, Akali Dal in Punjab, and Tel-
ugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh have also arisen after the creation of
linguistic states. These parties have pressed for specific political de-
mands that will create greater awareness in the rest of India, and par-
ticularly in the Indian capital of New Delhi, of the needs of their
respective states.3 9 In many states, such as Tamil Nadu, linguistic au-
tonomy, combined with other areas of constitutional autonomy, such
as education and the state political system, has proved to be a power-
ful instrument for asserting unique identities within the larger Indian
framework.4
In addition to creating states along linguistic and cultural lines,
India's federalism has also evolved institutions for cultural autonomy
within states. These acts stem from the recognition that India's diver-
sity is so vast that it would be impracticable to subdivide existing
states repeatedly in order to create new states for every small tribe or
group.
In West Bengal, the federal and state governments have estab-
lished a "hill council" for the Gurkhas, who speak a Nepali dialect and
who originally demanded full statehood for the area surrounding Dar-
jeeling. Similarly, in Assam, the federal and state governments have
recently reached an agreement with organizations representing the
Bodo hill tribe to create a Bodo hill council that, within predomi-
nantly Bodo districts, will have substantial autonomy over local af-
fairs.4 ' Such councils effectively create states within states and
represent yet another form of autonomy within the Indian system.
Solutions like these are now being explored in areas of other states,
such as the Ladakh region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Although Jammu and Kashmir is a Muslim-majority state, Ladakh is
predominantly populated by Buddhists. The federal government
would prefer to create a hill council rather than accede to the
39. Uzma Burki, Regional Political Parties in India: Akali Dal and DMK-AIADMK,
1990 FTCHER FORUM 128, 129.
40. MAPnK TuL.Y, No FuLa STOPS IN INDIA 69-71 (1991). The Muslim-majority state
of Jammu and Kashmir is a special case governed separately by the constitution because of
the state's unique history and culture. In order to preserve the special culture of the state
(through the population distribution), only those born in the state may own property
within the state or hold elective office. INDIA CONS. art. 370.
41. Kalyan Chaudhuri, A Gathering Storm, FRoN'xrNt,, May 22, 1992, at 33,37; "Deal
to Settle Bodoland Issue, HINDu IWTL ED., Feb. 27, 1993, at 1.
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Ladakhis' demands for Union Territory status,4 2 which is just short of
full statehood, particularly in a sensitive state that includes the vio-
lence-plagued Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley. 43 This approach
seeks to strike a balance between maintaining stability within the
states by not affecting their territorial integrity, while at the same time
finding a way to provide enhanced self-representation for otherwise
under-represented tribes and linguistic groups.
State autonomy over areas such as health, education, and other
facets of social policy has also permitted experimentation by different
states. One example of successful experimentation is seen in the
southern state of Kerala. Kerala has achieved a record of low birth-
rates, long life expectancy, total liberty, and a working system of
health care, setting it apart from the rest of the Indian states. Many
sociologists have credited the successive Communist governments' im-
plementation of unique social policies for improving the welfare of the
people of Kerala.44
Similarly, West Bengal, with its history of Communist governance
(sixteen consecutive years to date), has achieved a compact between
labor and management. Ironically, this has been achieved notwith-
standing Communist pro-labor rhetoric, because of the government's
ability to implement policies that support workers and its influence
with the trade unions that has prevented labor disputes from affecting
the state's economy.45 Thus, state autonomy has created a fertile
ground for experimentation, allowing new ideas to be tested that can
then be followed by other states, while preserving the ability of indi-
vidual sub-societies to express themselves uniquely.
42. INDIA CONsT. arts. 239, 239A, 240. Union territory status is conferred by Act of
Parliament. The Act defines whether the center will directly govern the territory and all of
its affairs, or whether it will create a small legislature with limited powers over finances and
law and order. Unlike a state, all of a union territory's powers are a creation of Parlia-
ment; it has no independent powers, such as the environmental powers in the State List,
granted by the constitution.
43. For background see Soma Basu, Ladakh's Turbulency, FRONTLINE, Oct. 23, 1992,
at 34. Ladakhi Buddhists have been agitating for more autonomy from the Jammu and
Kashmir state government because of their perception that the dominant Kashmiri popula-
tion has discriminated against them and deprived them of their share of power in the state.
Id; Smriti Srinivas, The Lost Horizon? Problems in a Strategic Spot, FRONTLINE, Oct. 26,
1991, at 81-87.
44. Venkatesh Athreya, The Kerala Model, FRONTLINE, May 25-June 7, 1991, 97-98.
Also, for a comprehensive study of Kerala's recent political history as well as the historical
background of Kerala's developmental successes, see T.J. NossrER, COMMUNISM IN KER.
ALA (1982).
45. TULLY, supra note 40, at 190-92; Kunal Bose, Survey of West Bengal, FiN. TINIES,
Jan. 11, 1994, at 29.
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Even though India's federal system provides areas of autonomy,
there is a strong bias in favor of the federal government. For example,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the constitution as stating that In-
dia has only one sovereign government, thereby affirming the federal
government's supremacy over the states 6 In line with this view of
sovereignty, the only recognized citizenship in India is national citi-
zenship; state citizenship is not recognized.4 7 Under the Supreme
Court's ruling in Pradeep Jain v. India, one state cannot give prefer-
ence to its own residents over the residents of another state4 ,
The federal government, particularly the judicial branch, also has
broad power to regulate and enforce civil liberties in the states.
Although the states are responsible for law and order, the Indian
Supreme Court is the final arbiter in areas of civil rights. The
Supreme Court has a duty to uphold the constitution, including the
Article on Fundamental Rights, arising under the constitution.49 As a
consequence, the Supreme Court must intervene in state affairs in or-
der to secure fundamental rights.
Public interest litigation often provides the opportunity for the
Supreme Court to protect citizens' constitutional rights. Through
public interest litigation the Supreme Court has given itself the power
to order investigations into abuses of civil liberties by state govern-
ments and by the federal government5 0 For instance, even though
46. West Bengal v. India, A.LRL (S.C.) 1241, 1255-56, 1259-60 (1963). This landmark
case established that state governments have no sovereignty of their own; their poiers are
only devolved to them by the sovereign federal government. Id. at 1255-56. Specifically,
the Court held that Parliament had the power to acquire the property of the state through
legislation. Id
47. Pradeep Jain v. India, A.LR. (S.C.) 1420, 1424 (1984).
48. Id. In Pradeep, the Court held that educational institutions could not reserve scats
for residents of the state in which the institutions were located. The Court reasoned that
since residents of all states were Indian citizens, and because only one domicile %as recog-
nized by the constitution, no distinction could be made on the basis of residency. Id. at
1427.
49. Josm, supra note 2, at 47-107.
50. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India, A.LR. (S.C.) 802, 810-11 (1984). Public interest
litigation, as exemplified by these cases, allows the Supreme Court to hear casc3 brought
by citizens and organizations on behalf of groups of litigants. The Supreme Court has
eased the rules of standing in order to allow a very loose definition of "public interest."
This has permitted citizens to initiate litigation by sending letters and postcards to the
Court expressing concern about a matter "in the public interest." As long as one is not
acting regarding a private wrong, this is permitted. Id. at 808, 812-13. In Bandhua Mtiki
Morcha, the Court ordered an investigation by a senior civil servant into the condition of
bonded laborers (indentured servants) at quarries in the state of Haryana, The civil scr-
vant was to report back within three months regarding the identity and condition of
bonded laborers in order to permit their release under judicial supervision. Id. at 834-37.
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control of prisons comes under the State List, the Supreme Court, in
Sheela Barse v. India, acting on the petition of a social worker, or-
dered all high courts and district judges to submit to it certain infor-
mation. The information regarded juvenile prisoners being held in
adult facilities and the existence of juvenile courts in different parts of
the country. The Supreme Court also ordered state governments "to
bring into force and to implement vigorously the provisions of the
Children's Acts enacted in the various States."-" The Supreme
Court's activism in public interest litigation has had a significant im-
pact upon Indian society by forcing governments at all levels to be
accountable to a higher authority on matters involving civil rights.
State powers may not unduly interfere with freedom of interstate
commerce. The Court has held that neither Parliament nor any state
legislature may enact a law that hinders freedom of interstate trade
and commerce.52 This means that the Indian economy functions as a
single market that may not be impeded by trade barriers resulting
from claims of state sovereignty. However, states may enact
"[r]egulatory measures or... compensatory taxes for the use of trad-
ing facilities" if they do not "materially affect freedom of trade, com-
merce and intercourse."53 Unlike in the United States, measures such
as the octroi, which is the tax paid by truckers and other motorists
whenever they cross state borders, are permissible because they have
been interpreted as not "materially hindering" trade.54
C. Controversial Features of Indian Federalism
While many of the aspects of a strong federal authority are widely
accepted as positive features of the Indian political structure, certain
For a tiscussion of public interest litigation in India, see P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism
and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 561 (1985).
51. Sheela Barse v. India, A.I.R. (S.C.) 1773, 1779 (1986). The Children's Acts are
laws in different states that are directed toward investigation and prosecution of crimes
against minors. Id. at 1776. The statutes provide that children shall not be held in jails. Id.
at 1777.
52. Automobile Transport Ltd. v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. (S.C.) 1406, 1424 (1962).
53. Id. The test that the Court used was whether traders who had the use of certain
facilities for better conduct of businesses were not paying much more thin was required for
provision and maintenance of such facilities. Id. at 1425. In this case, the Court reasoned,
the purpose of the tax was to maintain the road network as opposed to actually taxing
trade itself. Id.
54. The octroi is being phased out, at least in its present form, after truck drivers went
on strike over the issue. Pathkar is a form of vehicle license fee on owners of trucks that
has been abolished. Truck Operators Call Off Strike, HINDU INT'L ED., Aug. 14, 1993, at 9.
The octrol is still constitutional, however, even if not politically palatable.
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powers held by the federal government have been questioned and
have raised a controversy over the character of India's federal system.
One commentator has questioned whether, for example, central gov-
ernment inquiries into the conduct of state governments amount to a
shift from "cooperative federalism" to "supervisory federalism."' -'
This practice was, however, ruled constitutional by the Court!',
In addition, fiscal relations between the center and the states
have proved difficult. Over the years, the states have demanded more
control over the revenue that their respective residents pay to the cen-
tral government. According to the constitution, revenue is to be dis-
tributed only after considering the Finance Commission's
recommendations.5 7
In reality, however, the Commission's recommendation is only
one factor in determining the distribution of revenue. First, politics
has often interfered with the distribution of resources. Additionally,
because states have always lacked the necessary resources for their
needs, they have looked to the central government for assistance.- s
More recently, however, as the government has deregulated and liber-
alized the economy, government spending has become less important
as the amount of central planning has declined. Currently, the states
have greater opportunities to become independent actors in seeking
private investment in order to strengthen their own economies.5 9
The subject of the most intense debate is the central govern-
ment's power to dismiss state governments under article 356 of the
constitution and impose six-month periods of direct or presidential
rule, subject to approval by Parliament.60 Many cases have been con-
troversial.61 Undoubtedly, exercise of this power has been necessary
in certain instances. In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the normal
democratic machinery has become completely dysfunctional in the
55. Anirudh Prasad, Central Inquiry into State Affairs: March from Cooperative Feder-
alism to Supervisory Federalism, 25 Cn,. & MIL LJ. 145, 145-46. 152-53 (19S9). Pras2d
expresses concern about the resulting imbalance in the distribution of poaver b-t%%een the
center and the states. See id. at 145-46. He argues that the potential for abuse is present
and that state governments should be trusted for investigation of ordinary lapses. Ld. at
152-53.
56. Karnataka v. India A.LR. (S.C.) 68 (1978) (holding it constitutional for central
government to conduct an inquiry into conduct of a minister of Karnataka).
57. INDiA CONST. art. 270.
58. SETALVAD, supra note 4, at 117.
59. R. Krishnan, The States and the New Industrial Policy. Hr-u INT'L ED., Oct. 31,
1992, at 9.
60. INDIA Cos N. art. 356.
61. Rajeev Dhavan, President's Rule: Recent Trends, 31 J. LNDiA L. INsT. 521 (19S9).
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past four years.62 In the case of the state of Uttar Pradesh in late
1992, the state government failed to keep its commitment to protect a
disputed religious structure at Ayodhya.63
The dismissal power has also been used unnecessarily by different
parties in power to further "regime interests" at the cost of "constitu-
tional sensibilities."' 64 Many Indians resent the exercise of article 356
power and feel this is the most glaring distortion in India's federal
system, resulting in a serious imbalance of power between the federal
and state governments.65 The use of article 356 by the federal govern-
ment, therefore, poses an important challenge for both the center and
the states as their relationship evolves over the coming decades.66
Overall, the Indian federal system has grown into a structure ca-
pable of creating new institutions and redistributing power as new
challenges arise from its diverse population. Differences nevertheless
remain between the center and the states regarding how the balance
of power, now tilted in favor of the center in certain key areas, ought
to be shifted, and if it should be shifted at all. Therefore, there
promises to be a lively ongoing dialogue in the coming years.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
The European Economic Community (EEC) was established in
1957 when six European countries (West Germany, France, Italy, and
the Benelux countries) signed the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty).67
Subsequently, Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Portugal
signed the treaty and have been admitted to the EEC.68 The treaty
was designed to create a European Common Market in which nations
would cooperate in trade and commerce. In the 1980s and 1990s the
Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht
62. See Harinder Baweja, Losing Control, INDIA TODAY, May 31, 1993, at 24-34.
63. Babri Masjid Destroyed, HINDU INT'L ED., Dec. 12, 1992, at 1; K.K. Katyal,
Sharma Asks PM to Uphold Rule of Law, HINDU INT'L ED., Dec. 12, 1992, at 2.
64. Dhavan, supra note 61, at 522.
65. Iyer, supra note 11, at 79-80.
66. The issue of the constitutional criteria for implementation of article 356 is now
pending before a nine-justice constitutional bench of the Supreme Court, after the Madhya
Pradesh High Court declared central rule in that state invalid in April 1993. Central Rule
in M.P. Quashed, HINDU INT'L ED., Apr. 10, 1993, at 1.
67. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY];
see also MICHAEL J. COLLINS, WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: IMPLICATIONS I-OR
U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY 7 (1992).
68. COLLINS, supra note 67, at 7.
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Treaty) expanded the concept behind the Common Market by estab-
lishing the goal of a united Europe with common economic, foreign
and defense policies. 9 These treaties, which have resulted in the new,
unrestricted European market that commenced at the beginning of
1993, have paved the way for new roles for the European institutions
that have been evolving since 1957. The most important question that
remains is how much unity Europeans want to achieve through their
all-European institutions.
A. EC Institutional Structure
The EC Commission keeps the EC functioning on a day-to-day
basis. It has been described as "the civil service of the Community."7d
On one hand, just like the civil services in many countries, it is closely
involved in the management, supervision, and implementation of
Community policies. 1 However, because the members of the Com-
mission are appointed "by common accord"-in other words, by con-
sensus between the member states-a significant political dimension is
added to the normal bureaucratic approach to policy implementa-
tion.72 Members often reflect national interests, thereby creating a
major challenge for the EC in maintaining "impartial 'Community
consciousness."' 73
The Council of Ministers is the main decision-making institution
and is the "principal meeting place of the national governments."74
The Council consists of a representative of each member state at the
ministerial level. It is headed by a presidency which is held in turn by
each member state for a six month term.75 The presidency is responsi-
ble for agenda setting, consensus formation, and representation of the
Council in its dealings both inside and outside the EC.7b
When the Council makes decisions, the votes of the Council
members are weighted according to the population of the state, but
are weighted in such a way that when a qualified majority is required
the five larger states cannot outvote the seven smaller states. This
69. MAAsmcirr TREAYr pmbl.
70. NEILL NUGENT, THE GovERNmNr AND PoLrcs OF THE EuRo1P~v; CO'. ' u.
Nrr 61 (1991).
71. 1I at 61, 74.
72. MASTRcHT TREATY art. 158(2).
73. NUGENT, supra note 70, at 62.
74. Id. at 100.
75. MAArsc-r TREATY art. 146.
76. CoLuINs, supra note 67, at 104-05.
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system preserves a balance between pure majority-based democracy
and the rights of small states to have a voice in the process.77
The European Parliament forms the legislative branch of the EC.
It is the only directly, popularly elected all-EC institution. The
number of representatives allotted to each member state is weighted
according to a method similar to the one used to weigh votes in the
Council.78 Political parties at an all-European level are considered by
the framers of the EEC Treaty to be an important means of fostering
integration among member states. 79 The Parliament furthers this goal
to the extent that it is accountable to the people of Europe and pur-
sues policies that render the Commission accountable to the collective
public.
However, tension exists between the Commission and the Parlia-
ment. Parliament's power to appoint an ombudsman to investigate
public complaints conflicts with the Commission's coordination of pol-
icies of individual government agencies. These agencies are composed
of officials who are unwilling to be accountable to the European Par-
liament.8 0 This problem highlights the continuing challenge of shap-
ing a meaningful European federal democratic system that will be
able to transcend individual national governments.
Europe's judicial branch is made up of the EC's European Court
of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),
a non-EC body. The ECJ, which consists of thirteen judges, is respon-
sible for direct application of the law in certain cases and, more gener-
ally, for interpreting Community law.81 The ECHR, on the other
hand, is responsible for securing individual rights in any country that
is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, in accord-
ance with the stated aim in the Convention of "the achievement of
greater unity between its Members" through the "maintenance and
further realization of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 82
77. MAASTsric TREATY art. 148(2); NUGENT, supra note 70, at 118. When a new
policy is initiated, or existing policy is further modified, unanimity is required. MAAS-
TIciTr TREATY art. 148(2). Simple majority voting is only used for procedural purposes.
Id.
78. MAAsTRicHTr TREATY art. 138(2).
79. Id. art. 138a.
80. ld. art. 138e; NUGENT, supra note 70, at 138-39.
81. NUGENT, supra note 70, at 178.
82. European Convention on Human Rights, pmbl., quoted in Colin Warbrick, "Fed-
eral" Aspects of the European Convention on Human Rights, 10 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 698,725
(1989); MARK W. JAis & RicHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RiGHTS LAW 36-37
(1990).
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B. The Workings of the Emerging EC System
The major issue before the EC is the question of how much sov-
ereignty will be retained by member states, since the EC's power is
derived entirely from the measure of sovereignty that individual na-
tion states have chosen to surrender. According to the terms of the
Maastricht Treaty, the EC is mandated to follow the principle of "sub-
sidiarity," which requires that the Community only act in circum-
stances when it is in a better position to address a problem than
individual member states. Otherwise, actions are to be left to the indi-
vidual states.8 3 The difficulty with this mandate lies in its implementa-
tion by European leaders, who must decide just how power ought to
be distributed. Inevitably, there are conflicting opinions about which
level of government is best suited to deal with particular problems.
On one side, one can identify a clear trend toward a more unified
Europe with a reduced emphasis on the preservation of sovereignty of
individual member states. The European judicial system has shown
little reluctance to extend its reach into the affairs of member states
by broadly interpreting the European Convention on Human
Rights&4 In Feldbrugge v. Netherlands, the ECHR held that civil
rights encompassed social insurance in interpreting the right to a "fair
and public hearing" in the "determination of... civil rights and obli-
gations."' The ECHR has also outlawed corporal punishment in
schools, overruling local objections on the grounds that certain rights
are fundamental in nature, regardless of local concerns.,
The ECHR's actions reflect an impulse to develop a "constitu-
tional" role beyond maintaining the "international relationship" that
it has with the member states.87 Moreover, it shows an apparent will-
ingness to emphasize individual rights over sensitivity to state inter-
83. M.Asucrr TREATY art. 3b. The definition of "subsidiarity" is vague and still
evolving. The basic principle is that the Community's powers will be limited to thoSe that
can be more effectively exercised by the Community rather than by member states acting
individually. By applying this principle, states will be given meaningful autonomy over
their own affairs from Brussels bureaucrats. Moreover, subsidiarity can also b2 applied to
the distinction between the governmental sphere and the private lives of individuals; under
this principle, government would have to allow maximum autonomy for the individual,
except where it is absolutely necessary for the government to intervene. For an interesting
discussion of the meaning and implications of subsidiarity, see The Subsidianty Principle,
27 Co~mMoN Mk-r. L. Rnv,. 181-84 (1990).
84. Warbrick, supra note 82, at 711.
85. Feldbrugge v. Netherlands, S Eur. Ct. L. (ser. A) at 425 (19S6).
86. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1978).
87. Id. at 722.
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ests.s8 As a consequence, Europeans now have a court of last resort
to which they can appeal, similar to the U.S. and Indian Supreme
Courts. This demonstrates that Europe has, particularly in the area of
its civil rights law, begun to move toward greater emphasis on "Eu-
rope," rather than on individual nation-states.8 9 This trend, on the
other hand, could also pose a threat to the spirit of subsidiarity, since a
"federal" European court's determination that a right is fundamental
forecloses debate about which level of government is best able to ad-
dress violations of that right.90
In the economic sphere, the conflicting trends of unification and
retention of sovereignty are particularly apparent. At one end of the
spectrum, as of 1993 Europe has dropped trade barriers between
member states.91 However, while the structure of the common eco-
nomic market has started to evolve, both practical and psychological
obstacles to the dismantling of national sovereignty remain.
In the economic sphere, the integration of well-entrenched indi-
vidual economies has proved to be a difficult process. The European
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which was created as an interme-
diate step toward creating a common currency, has involved a "com-
promise between fixed and floating exchange rates" with a common
schedule of exchange rates.92 Because of the complex interaction be-
tween individual currencies and economies, however, this mechanism
is prone to the kind of crisis that erupted recently, which resulted in
the withdrawal of more than one nation from the ERM.-3
Psychologically, European states have yet to achieve a "federal
basis for regulating currency values" and still have to overcome the
"economic nationalism ... [that] was [once] expressed through ex-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 725.
90. Id. at 722.
91. MAAsrmicr TREATY art. 7a.
92. Allen Neely, British Resistance to European Integration: An Historical and Legal
Analysis with an Examination of the United Kingdom's Recent Entry into the European
Monetary System, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 113, 131 (1991). The ERM is part of the European
Monetary System, in which a common reserve fund is used to provide for market interven-
tion to stabilize exchange rates; each country allocates 20% of its reserves to the fund.
NUGENT, supra note 70, at 225. The European Currency Unit (ECU) is a reserve asset. Id.
The ERM provides for fixed bands of exchange, with provisions for adjustment for curren-
cies that enter the system. Id. All currencies are held within two percent of a rate set
collectively by Finance Ministers of the Member States. COLLINS, supra note 67, at 30.
93. Mayhem, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 15. This crisis erupted over the serious
destabilization of the exchange rates and the inability of EC Finance Ministers to reach a
consensus regarding the band of exchange rates. Id.
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change controls, rigid protection of domestic markets, and crippling
restrictions on multinational business." 94 Therefore, while the Maas-
tricht Treaty sets out the goal of eliminating distortions in member
countries' individual economies, such as deficits,95 by forging common
fiscal policies and standards, this degree of economic integration is
still unrealized because it conflicts with the retention of sovereignty.
In the area of foreign policy and defense, the trend toward na-
tionalism has been most noticeable. In the words of one commenta-
tor, "[i]t has indeed been anomalous that despite the repeated calls
since the early 1970s for a Europe that will speak with one voice, the
Community has never successfully translated its internal economic
might to commensurate outside influence." 96 The ongoing crisis in
Bosnia has exposed this problem in policymaking. The European po-
sitions have lacked unity and resolve in addressing the political, eco-
nomic and military issues raised by the crisis; for example, only four
member states have been willing to pledge large numbers of soldiers
to enforce peace in the area that is close to the heart of Europe. 9 The
lack of unity suggests that individual nations continue to be guided by
their own individual interests, thereby reflecting the conflict between
the decentralization oriented spirit of subsidiarity (even in areas such
as defense and foreign policy, which are not normally associated with
localized interests) and the trend toward unification.
Underlying these conflicting trends is the larger question of how
much sovereignty each member state wishes to retain. Under the
present treaty, the sovereignty of member states will be preserved ac-
cording to the somewhat vague, still evolving, concept of sub-
sidiarity. s As has been shown in different areas of policynaking, the
relationship between Brussels (the headquarters of the EC) and mem-
ber states' national capitals continues to be strained. Many citizens
and commentators have expressed concern about a "democratic defi-
cit" because many areas of EC activity are not "directly held account-
able by elected representatives." 99 This outcry continues in spite of
the fact that the member states as well as their parliaments ratified the
94. Jim Hoagland, Europe's September Shock, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN/ASH. POSTI
LE MONDE WEEKLY, Oct. 11, 1992, at 8.
95. MAAsrmcrr TREATY art. 104c.
96. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. 2403. 24'2 (1991)
(footnote omitted).
97. Air Drop on Bosnia, EcoNoMIsr, Feb. 27,1993, at 16. This editorial explains some
of the failures of EC policy in solving what is essentially a European problem. Id.
98. I -sucPrr TR.EATY art. 3b.
99. KiRcHNER, supra note 3, at 14.
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treaties establishing the Community which gave such a limited role to
the European Parliament. 10° This dichotomy illustrates the competing
impulses that continue to affect Europeans' view of their evolving sys-
tem; while their people and institutions have ratified the process of
unity, both leaders and citizens still are anxious about losing the iden-
tity that comes from national sovereignty.
The British reaction to the need to surrender some measure of
sovereignty to become a part of a unified Europe is illustrative of the
difficulties encountered by a nation-state with a well-formed national
identity in becoming a part of a larger community of states. Although
Britain is a part of the EC, it has expressed more hostility than any
other member state toward the "idea of political, or any other sort of
union among the European states." 10 1 Some Britons have actively
questioned the value of European unification because of the threat of
infringement of parliamentary sovereignty.102 As a consequence, Brit-
ain successfully resisted the use of the word "federal" in the Maas-
tricht Treaty in order to ward off the creation of a more closely
integrated European state.103 Also, Britain has secured the right to
opt out of the plan for a common European currency.104 These con-
cerns reflect the misgivings of British citizens about a more closely
integrated European order.
The challenge before the EC member states, as they seek to func-
tion effectively within a cohesive structure, is to balance the drive to-
ward unity with attention to the nationalist feelings that still dominate
the citizens of individual member states. This tension continues to be
reflected in the actions of constituent governments and EC
institutions.
V. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO VIEWS OF
FEDERALISM
The two federal systems discussed here are similar insofar as they
have transcended the boundaries of the modern nation-state; the sys-
tems encompass a variety of languages and traditions within a com-
mon framework. They also share the goals of balancing unity and
100. Weiler, supra note 96, at 2468.
101. Neely, supra note 92, at 115.
102. Id. at 122. Compare Case 10677, Amministrazione dell Finaze dello stato v. Sim-
menthal S.p.A, [1977] 3 E.C.R. 629, 643, which "preclude[s] the valid adoption of new
national legislative measures ... incompatible with Community provisions." Id.
103. Neely, supra note 92, at 136.
104. Hoagland, supra note 94, at 16.
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diversity by ensuring autonomy for individual states while formulating
common economic, foreign and defense policies.
Nevertheless, the two approaches to federalism are fundamen-
tally different, thereby posing certain ramifications for their effective-
ness. The Indian model provides for a strong federal authority as the
sole sovereign power along with constitutionally empowered states
that are divided along linguistic and cultural lines. By contrast, the
European system is an association of sovereign states from which the
central authority derives its power. While the Indian model has the
advantage of a strong central authority that can formulate a clearly
defined set of policies, it has resulted in a clamor by the Indian states
for more autonomy. On the other hand, a relatively weak central au-
thority provides for national sovereignty and preservation of individ-
ual national aspirations. Nevertheless, without a strong elected
central government, bureaucrats may well seize the initiative at the
center, possibly resulting in a lack of policy coordination. Such poten-
tial problems are exemplified by the "democratic deficit" in the EC, as
well as the difficulties encountered in forming a common currency and
a coherent foreign policy.'05 Hence, as the Indian system continues to
develop, and as the EC emerges as a full-fledged entity, both systems
will be challenged to strike a fair balance of power between the con-
stituent units and the central authority. The resolution of this prob-
lem will be central to the determination of how decisions will be made
and how effective policymaking will be.
A. Lessons from the Indian Experience for the EC
Because the Indian experience of a federal system within a di-
verse society spans more than forty-five years, broad lessons exist for
the EC as it develops its own system, albeit on its own terms."" These
lessons provide an insight into the experience of forging a sustainable
form of federalism out of vast diversity.
As the history of Indian federalism demonstrates, the major chal-
lenge for the EC, in pursuing its goal of subsidiarity, will be to prevent
overcentralization while maintaining a coherent central authority.
The challenge of balancing the demands and needs of constituent
105. KmcHNP, supra note 3, at 14-15 (discussing "democratic deficit").
106. Although there are possible lessons for India from the EC's decentralized ap-
proach, I have chosen to focus on the reverse argument because the EC has, unlike India,
not reached the stage of formation and integration at which its system has been tested
during crises. India's experience is unique in this respect as a multilingual, multi-ethnic
federation.
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units with those of the overarching authority will require constant vig-
ilance as the imperative for unity drives member states closer to-
gether. In order to preserve the EC, crisis management will have to
be the forte of central authorities.10 7
First, in areas such as education, health, and culture, the EC
would be well-advised to follow the Indian federal government's ex-
ample of delegating management to the states. The Indian federal
government has judiciously avoided interference in the areas of edu-
cation, health, and culture. 08 These areas come under the State List
under the constitution, 0 9 and the federal government has limited it-
self to working to bring states together to construct a broad national
agenda. In fact, when the central government allocates federal grants
to the states for health, it has virtually no control over the re-
sources." 0 Moreover, in many states, significant amounts of money
are transferred from state governments to village panchayats, or
councils."'
Even if the EC authorities decide to allocate significant resources
to the member states in these areas, particularly to the poorer states,
the central authority should allow member states' governments to
have complete control over the manner in which those resources are
used. This is especially true since areas such as health and education
touch people's lives more directly and intimately than the more ab-
stract spheres of foreign and macroeconomic policies. Furthermore,
this move will alleviate concerns by European statesmen, including
former French President Giscard d'Estaing, that intervention by the
central authority in areas such as education, health, and culture has
107. See Burki, supra note 39, at 143. The author contends that India's federal system
has an impressive record in addressing the challenges of regionalism by co-opting diverse
political movements and divisive regional issues and accommodating regional needs. Id.
108. Health is included in the State List. INDIA CONST. seventh sched. Although "cul-
ture" is not explicitly set forth in the State List, its inclusion can be inferred from the
existence of other items such as pilgrimages, museums, libraries, and theaters, which are
financed by state governments, as well as from state control over naming of the official
state language. Id. seventh sched., art. 345. Because education is included in the Concur-
rent List, there is greater room for central intervention. See id. seventh sched. However,
control over the important issue of language gives states strong influence over schools.
TULLY, supra note 40, at 69.
109. INDIA CONST. art. 246, seventh sched.
110. K. S. Nayar, Health Care Deplored as Elitist, INDIA ABROAD, Nov. 13, 1992, at 34.
111. See discussion of local taxation and its role in local democracy in V. G. James,
Democratisation of Devolved Legislation in Local Taxation, 26 J. INDIAN L. INST. 518
(1984); see also Shiraz Sidhva, Survey of West Bengal, FIN. TiMES, Jan. 11, 1994, at 29.
Sidhva refers to the eastern state of West Bengal's well-developed panchayat system in the
state's villages.
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affected each state's ability to maintain its own autonomy and iden-
tity." 2 Most importantly, if decision-making power in these areas is
left to member states and their citizens, these groups wiU be empow-
ered to experiment on their own.
The need for managing unity within diversity will be seriously
tested as East European states seek entry into the EC and as crises,
such as the 1993 Bosnian civil war, erupt as a result of the fall of com-
munism. While the East European states are likely to expect highly
democratic institutions as they emerge from despotic rule, the EC in-
stitutions, as observers David Kennedy and David E. Webb have
pointed out, will, as a part of the formation of a coherent union, utilize
a more centralized, bureaucratic, "technocratic" machinery in Brus-
sels."~ Consequently, the process of integrating Eastern Europe into
the EC in order to complete the process of unification and thereby
further stabilize Europe will require that EC institutions show particu-
lar respect for the predicament of East European nations as they
struggle to modernize their polities and economies. They should be
ushered into the Community over a phased period that not only re-
spects their need to redefine their political and economic systems, but
also prevents the rest of the EC's slowly emerging culture from being
disrupted by the new waves of ethnic conflict and nationalism affect-
ing Eastern Europe. 114 For the promotion of stability, early East Eu-
ropean representation in at least a minimal form in the decision-
making process, such as observer status in the Council of Ministers, is
crucial for paving the way to a more united Europe.
The incorporation of Eastern European states will also mean that
the EC will have to accommodate ethnic diversity without allowing
uncontrolled self-determination to fragment Europe. The Indian ex-
perience, notwithstanding its failures and flaws, presents a significant
example of a country that has developed methods, such as hill councils
and linguistic states, to integrate a multitude of groups within one sys-
tem, while ensuring the greatest possible opportunity for these groups
to represent themselves. The notable feature of the Indian approach
has been to place the integrity of the union and democracy at a pre-
112. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Borderline Territory, GUARDIAN VEEKLY, O t. 18, 1992,
at 4.
113. David Kennedy & David E. Webb, Integration: Eastern Europe and the European
Economic Communities, 28 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L 633, 674 (1990).
114. Neill Nugent, The Deepening and Widening of the Europcan Community: Rcccnt
Evolution, Maastrich4 and Beyond, 30 J. Co.NioN Mtcr. STrruius 311, 323-24 (1992).
Here, Nugent refers to the difficulties associated with "widening" the EC, in light of tur-
moil in Eastern Europe. Id.
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mium while preserving the rights of various groups to political and
cultural self-expression. If the EC is eventually to encompass the
whole of Europe without destroying itself, then the Indian federal
model provides an example of how Europe can begin to achieve this
goal, particularly in areas with significant amounts of diversity such as
the former Yugoslavia. For this to happen in Europe, however, it will
require a radically different attitude toward living with diversity than
has been exhibited over hundreds of years, during which narrow na-
tionalism has been the norm.
Second, India's experience shows that the EC must avoid the pit-
falls of allowing any single political group to gain a monopoly over
power in such a diverse union. The fact that no one group in India has
been able to seize the lion's share of the power, unlike the Serbs in the
former Yugoslavia, or the Russians in the former Soviet Union, has
been one of the most important unifying factors.
Presently, the first Indian Prime Minister from the South, P.V.
Narasimha Rao, is in power partly because of a parliament in which
the South is in a dominant position for the first time.15 This has hap-
pened with relatively little controversy or notice, despite the North's
dominance of national electoral politics during the first forty-four
years of India's independence. 1 6 Despite the North's dominance dur-
ing those years, southerners occupied key decision-making posts in
the Cabinet, in the courts, and in the civil services, thereby compen-
sating for their lack of significant representation elsewhere. Also, In-
dian prime ministers have traditionally been responsible for and
sensitive to maintaining a respective regional balance in their cabi-
nets." 7 By attempting to represent all regions of India in Parliament,
the Indian government has sought to alleviate the potential tension
stemming from regional economic imbalances, especially since the
115. This is due to a change in the voting patterns in the south, which accounts for 25%
of the Indian population. The results of the 1991 general election left the governing Con-
gress Party with more than half of its parliamentary delegation coming from five southern
and southwestern states. Swing Patterns, INDIA TODAY, July 15, 1991, at 24-28.
116. In fact, despite the internal factional struggles between leaders with different re-
gional bases, the Congress Party won two of four northern states and finished a close sec-
ond in a third state. These victories resulted in Prime Minister Rao consolidating his
position as party leader. See Inderjit Badhwar, Rao's Revival, INDIA TODAY, Dec. 31,
1993, at 14-20.
117. Tarun Basu, Rao Shuffles Council of Ministers, INDIA ABROAD, Jan. 22, 1993, at 6.
Regional representation was an important factor in the Prime Minister's choice of a new
cabinet. While it was not the only factor, he had to ensure that the cabinet was regionally
balanced once all the posts were filled. Id.
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South and West are economically much stronger than other parts of
the country." 8
This lesson is important for Europe to learn, since the looming
presence of Germany continues to cause concern in the rest of Eu-
rope.119 If, for example, Germany and other German-speaking groups
in neighboring countries that might become members of the EC in the
future were to gain control of the EC, the integrity of the union could
be threatened. Therefore, although the EC has protected small coun-
tries in the Council and in the European Parliament through its voting
formula, it will need to take further action to build institutions that
dilute majorities. In the future, a more closely united Europe will find
it necessary to build more institutions representative of its people.
Such institutions may include a judiciary made up of equal numbers of
people from the different member states, an upper house like the U.S.
Senate, a commission that will continue to have representatives from
all over the continent, and a strong all-European press that will not
reflect the dominance of any one region over another. While it may
be difficult to build such institutions overnight, plans must be made
now along these lines in order to create a Europe in which serious
crises, such as that in former Yugoslavia, can be resolved through col-
lective decision-making. Input from across Europe can serve to
achieve a common purpose.
Third, constitutional flexibility of the kind that India has been
able to achieve will also be crucial if the EC is to become a well-inte-
grated, cohesive unit. If the language of the governing documents, as
well as the process of altering the meaning of the documents to fit new
circumstances (either through amendments or through judicial re-
view), is flexible and has a broad sweep, as it does in India, then the
EC will be able to survive social changes, new ethnic aspirations, and
the other constitutional crises that it is bound to face as it evolves
12 O
Because the emergence of a post-nation-state is an ongoing process,
any rigidity on the part of EC authorities or member states will be
detrimental to further unification. Indeed, the use of the broad term
"subsidiarity" may well be appropriate, since it is broad and flexible
enough so that member states will not be hindered in the future if they
wish to redefine the principle. At the same time "subsidiarity" con-
veys a concept that forms an important cornerstone of European fed-
118. Kito De Boer & Gordon Fell, A Fresh Look at India, 1993 McKNsEY Q. 29, 36.
119. Hoagland, supra note 94, at 16.
120. Josm, supra note 2, at 24-25. Joshi refers to the "elastic" nature of the constitution
for "adaptation to India's changing and growing needs." Id. at 25.
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eralism. Similarly, the Indian Constitution, in accordance with its
Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights, has been able to accom-
modate numerous amendments to add new, officially recognized lan-
guages, 121 as well as new institutions devolving autonomy to tribes in
the Northeast, which has a history of political instability.122 If this
kind of flexibility is achieved in the EC, "Maastricht" may become a
symbol with which the vast majority of Europeans will be able to
identify.
Finally, cultural and societal integration, which India has
achieved to a significant extent despite its diversity, will have to form
the foundation upon which constitutional flexibility is achieved in the
EC. This flexibility will enable decision-making by collective institu-
tions under a central authority to flourish. For collective institutions
to develop, a "European" culture will have to evolve in the way that
an Indian culture has evolved over the centuries before a full, demo-
cratic, political union occurred in 1947. Only then will the constituent
states feel comfortable about giving the central authority the power to
formulate coherent policies that will bring groups together within a
common framework.
A significant degree of integration can be achieved through the
formation of strong pan-European social institutions of the kind that
exist in Indian society, spanning linguistic and regional lines. For in-
stance, an all-European press would serve as a unifying institution by
bringing together opinion-makers and ordinary Europeans of differ-
ent nationalities, both journalists and readers alike. In India, linguistic
barriers have been crossed with remarkable success, with magazines
such as India Today, which publishes not only its original English edi-
tion, but also in three southern languages, in one western language,
and in the dominant northern language, Hindi.'3 This has yielded a
unique concept of one magazine with different editions, all of which
influence, and are influenced by, each other.1 24 This experiment is
beginning to be followed by other publications as well, thereby creat-
ing a unique dialogue among various parts of the country and, in the
long term, strengthening the unity of the Indian state and society.
Similarly, all-European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
would help to strengthen all-European political institutions. Such or-
121. INDIA CONST. art. 344(1), eighth sched.
122. Id. art. 244(2), sixth sched.
123. Hindi is the official national language of India. Id. art. 343. However, English
continues to be used for official purposes.
124. Aroon Purie, Letter From the Editor, INDIA TODAY, Oct. 15, 1992, at 1.
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ganizations already exist and are continuing to grow in the areas of
business, labor, agriculture, and universities.125 However, these orga-
nizations are still not firmly entrenched and have yet to reach a point
at which they look at issues from a "European" perspective. More-
over, disputes between countries over issues such as controls on "for-
eign" satellite and cable television broadcasts from fellow EC
countries shows how far Europe has to go in transcending narrow lin-
guistic and cultural boundaries. 26
As European NGOs continue to develop an all-European per-
spective, Indian NGOs can serve as a model. India's National Literacy
Mission is a good example of an NGO project that has integrated a
national perspective with local needs by combining governmental
funds and planning with the skills and labor of local and regional vol-
untary organizations. A common strategy was formulated by a net-
work of voluntary organizations. Local forms of mass communication,
using local languages and dances, were employed to achieve the de-
sired goals. 2 7 As a consequence, despite the barriers of diversity,
more than 118 million additional persons have become literate be-
tween 1981 and 1991.1'
Indian NGOs have also been prominent in other areas. During
the recent earthquake in India, NGOs from all over India responded
rapidly to a crisis in a remote area and worked together in a relatively
well-coordinated effort.'2 9 Additionally, such all-India groups have
represented bonded laborers from remote rural areas of the country
in public interest litigation before the Supreme Court. By attempting
to ensure the protection of all Indians' rights, these NGOs help to
reinforce the strength of the Union. 30 This is a form of subsidiarity at
the levels of both citizenry and administration that Europeans would
do well to emulate in a variety of fields.
125. Fnn Laursen, The Maastricht Treaty: A Critical Evaluation, in THE IVNEPG0VEPZ-
IMNTAL CONFERENCE ON POLmCAL UNiON 249, 263 (Finn Laursen & Sophie
Vanhoonacker eds., 1992) (quoting CJ. FRDuoncH, CONST=IONAL Go,.PTr. ENT AND
DEMOCRACY 169, 193 (4th ed. 196S)).
126. Andrew Hill, Brussels May Prosecute UK over Television Curbs, FIr. TripEs, Oct.
9, 1993, at 1.
127. Madhavi Purohit, Darkness Dispelled, SUNDAY TIMES Or1 INDIA, Sept 8, 19A,
§ Sunday Review, at 1.
128. Id
129. Gill Tudor, Indian Quake Relief Draws Praise, Self-Criticism, REurTP. Linn- REP.,
Oct. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Lbyrpt File.
130. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India, A.LL (S.C.) 802, 805 (1934). In this case the
petitioning organization carried out a detailed study of bonded laborers from different
states working at quarries near New Delhi. Ld. at 802-10.
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B. The Prospects for Both Federal Systems
The Indian federal system is undergoing a period that is likely to
result in a gradual, controlled decentralization of power to the states
and, eventually, to local levels. In the past thirty to forty years, the
Indian government has created new institutions, thereby responding
to the demands and needs of various groups for self-recognition. De-
spite meeting such demands, the central government has not compro-
mised the essential unity and democracy of the overall system. In the
future, as part of this ongoing process, new states and hill councils
may be formed, particularly in response to tribal, linguistic, and other
local concerns. 131 Furthermore, the increasing liberalization of the
economic system will also allow states to create their own economic
policies and work with the private sector on their own terms.132 While
threats from separatist terrorism will continue to exist, particularly in
Kashmir, the past experience in Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and the North-
eastern states has shown that after prolonged conflicts in which the
center holds its ground, separatists will eventually realize, under popu-
lar pressure, that the federal system provides an opportunity for them
to gain a share of power, while the alternative is violence and
bloodshed. 33
Although some observers after the events at Ayodhya1 34 question
India's political unity and stability and how India's system can serve as
a model, it is the author's belief that there is little cause for worry
about India's ability to respond to the challenges posed by a variety of
forces. Above all else, the very strength of the Indian federal system
is its continued capacity to absorb new movements into the main-
stream. In the face of linguistic nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s,
violent communist movements between the 1950s and the 1970s, and
fundamentalist terrorism in the 1980s, the federal system has contin-
ued to exist. In short, although such movements have transformed the
face of mainstream India, they have not changed its essential ethos.
131. Iyer, supra note 11, at 82.
132. Krishnan, supra note 59, at 9.
133. Burki, supra note 39, at 144. Recent events in Punjab, including the re-introduc-
tion of the democratic processes, reaffirms this proposition. See Kanwar Sandhu, Normal
Life at Last, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 28, 1993, at 40.42.
134. See supra note 63. The destruction of a disputed religious structure at Ayodhya,
which is in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, in December 1992, triggered a week of
communal riots. The breakdown in law and order resulted in the imposition of direct cen-
tral government rule upon four states, including Uttar Pradesh, which had been governed
by the conservative Bharatiya Janata Party. Id. Other political parties accused the Bhara-
tiya Janata Party of complicity in the structure's destruction. Id.
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Remarkably, because the Indian social spectrum is so broad and
diverse it has room to absorb various forces within its scope. More-
over, the predominant Indian cultural and religious ethos is founded
on broad principles and concepts that lend themselves to the flexibil-
ity necessary to accommodate diversity under a single umbrella of val-
ues and ideals. Consequently, although the system includes a wide
range of competing political forces, such as hardline communists, ag-
gressive capitalists, and fundamentalists, all compete within a common
framework and set of rules, thereby working to accommodate each
other and forge a consensus that serves the national interest, as well as
local interests.
Furthermore, since attaining independence, India has exper-
ienced steady, if not spectacular, growth, rising to become the fifth
largest economy in the world in terms of gross domestic product. s
As India's liberalization program progresses, these growth rates are"
expected to increase. 6 If these historical trends in the growth rate
persist, it is likely that the value of the common Indian market, al-
ready an important reason for Indian unity, will become more appar-
ent, hence strengthening Indian unity.
The center will continue to remain strong in areas such as foreign
affairs, defense and economic policies-all areas in which a strong
federal government ought to continue to have significant authority. It
will also have to continue to play the role of a mediator between
states, as increased decentralization has resulted in conflicts over vari-
ous issues, such as the ongoing Cauvery River water dispute between
the southern states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. 7
In the case of the emerging European federal system, the drive
toward a union is unlikely to halt, given the advantages of greater co-
operation in the economic and political spheres. The development of
unifying institutions is already well in progress. Nevertheless, to
achieve a greater degree of unification, European nations must sur-
render a greater degree of national sovereignty. Unlike in India,
where nationalism was born out of strong cultural unifying factors,
such as common traditions, historic internal migration, and a historic
135. De Boer & Fell, supra note 118, at 31.
136. Lawrence Zuckerman, That Hum You Hear is Asia Growing, WALL Sr J., Ozt. 1S,
1993, at A12.
137. V. K. Varadarajan, A Short-lived Hope:. Towards Confrontation Orcr Caurer,
FRoNTLiNE, Mar. 13, 1992, at 27-28. Varadarajan describes the efforts of the Prime Minis-
ter to mediate between the Chief Ministers of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu in their dispute
over the allocation of water from the Cauvery River. The matter has been the subject of
adjudication by the Supreme Court, but Karnataka has rejected the Court's initial findings.
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freedom struggle that galvanized the entire subcontinent, Europe
lacks a strong sense of "European" nationalism.
The Indian experience thus suggests that cultivating European in-
tegration as a mass-based cause may provide a key impetus to unifica-
tion. As seen by France's narrow approval and Denmark's rejection
and subsequent narrow approval of the Maastricht Treaty, individual
differences continue to impede the process of unification. 138 Addi-
tionally, the postponement of plans to drop immigration barriers
when custom barriers were eliminated on January 1, 1993, represented
a setback to the process of creating a "European" society, which will
be essential for a durable Union.139 The future, consequently, will in-
volve a long, difficult, but probably irreversible road to the achieve-
ment of a unified European federal system.
VI. CONCLUSION
This analysis has attempted to demonstrate how India's exper-
iences with federalism are relevant to the EC's move toward the goal
of economic and political union. Because the process of creating a
federal Europe involves the association of diverse nationalities, the
experience of Indian federal institutions is instructive and serves as a
viable point of comparison. Some may question why the lessons of an
economically less-advantaged country such as India are valuable to
the EC. The answer is that no system other than the Indian federal
democratic system has transcended the typical parameters of the mod-
em nation-state. Therefore, many of the dilemmas and challenges
that India has faced, and continues to face, reflect those that Europe
must confront as it heads into a future of closer integration.
Furthermore, both of these systems have become relevant to the
larger world, which is witnessing the dual trends of further unification
and increased division. On the one hand, EC economic interdepen-
dence, various trading blocs, and strong nationalism in India are all
examples of greater unification. On the other hand, divisive tenden-
cies have increased, as manifested by the growth of separatist groups
138. Hoagland, supra note 94, at 16; see also Nugent, supra note 114, at 325 (on lack of
consultation with electorates). Nugent argues that referenda results show "how much inte-
gration is the creature of political, administrative and economic elites." Id.
139. Andrew Hill, Ministers Meet Today on Border Controls, FIN. TINIEs, Jan. 19, 1993,
at 2. The new date for elimination of border controls was December 1, 1993. Id. How-
ever, problems still exist, because of unease in countries like France about "illegal immi-
gration" and "weakening of security." Such fears about opening up seriously undermine
the prospects for a more unified EC in the near future. Id.
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resisting further political and economic union, especially in Europe
and in India. If these two systems, albeit in different stages of devel-
opment, continue to grow and develop and keep working to strike a
balance between unity and diversity, they will serve as significant ex-
anples for the rest of the world.
While the Indian federal system was formed in a context in which
free internal migration and a common culture have historically ex-
isted, the European federal structure is emerging from a tradition of
strongly held feelings of nationalism and sovereignty among the mem-
ber States. As a result, Europe's drive toward integration must over-
come formidable obstacles that even India, with its vast diversity, has
not had to encounter.
Ultimately, the pace at which Europe's emerging federal institu-
tions develop will be determined by how Europeans accept the notion
of an integrated European society, culture, and polity. The Indian ex-
perience has shown that the process of bringing together diverse
groups within a common framework of institutions requires grassroots
support and participation. However, even then, the struggle for de-
centralization and increasing mass participation continues.
Similarly, federal institutions will thrive and grow in the EC only
if Europeans have the collective will and conviction to participate in a
common decision-making process, thereby ensuring that a federal Eu-
rope is identified with, as well as empowers, citizens and not bureau-
cracies, while still maintaining a common system. The central lesson
from India is that without a strong commitment to this view of life, a
genuinely united Europe is impossible; with such a commitment, Eu-
rope can work toward transcending the conventional parameters of
the nation-state.
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